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RESPONSE TO APPELLEES STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellee Reagan's statement of the case.1 
Rather than address the overwhelming number of factual disputes improperly 
construed against Republic, their counsel elects to shrug this off with two separate and 
wholly false representations to this court. First Reagan represents that Republic's nature of 
the case section can be wholly ignored because it consists of "mostly a vitriolic diatribe, lacks 
any record citations, and provides little assistance with this Court's review of the relevant 
issues." (Reagan's Brief pg. 3). Republic welcomes this Court to review its initial brief, 
particularly pages 8-21 and ask whether or not indeed Republic failed to make "any record 
citations" as preposterously represented by Reagan. 
Second, Reagan asserts Republic has not challenged but one of the facts set forth in 
the order of September 30, 2008. (Reagan's Brief pg. 6) This too, is wholly false.2 In fact 
issue 8 of Republic's brief is specifically addressed to the improper application of summary 
judgment. However, its not the facts that were included in the trial Court's order of 
September 30, 2008 that most offend Republic and warrant reversal, it's the facts wholly 
omitted from the trial Court's order or otherwise just ignored by the Court below. 
Reagan craftily ignores the facts in the record below in its appellate response and 
1
 Since UDOT incorporated in by reference all facts cited by Reagan, this response of 
Republic would necessarily apply to both Appellees Reagan and UDOT. 
2
 See e.g. Appellant's Brief pg. 21, fn. 19; Appellant's Brief, pg. 26, fn. 21; Appellant's 
Brief pg. 55, fn. 38, all setting forth specific factual disputes or inferences from said facts which 
were construed by the trial court not in favor of Republic, but in favor of Appellees. 
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relies wholly on the September 30, 2008 "findings of fact" in that order as being the entire 
record, presuming that Republic will blindly respond thereto. This offer is declined. The law 
is clear — on appeals from a summary judgment motion this Court affords no deference to 
the legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary judgment.3 Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Center* 200 P.3d 643 (Utah 2008); 
(Schurtz v BMW of N. Am., Inc. ,814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991) [emphasis added]. Accordingly, 
Republic, in its principal brief, gave no deference to the trial court's alleged "findings of 
fact"; instead Republic cited extensively to the record pointing out the same facts properly 
presented to the trial court below, but ignored almost entirely by the trial court in reaching 
its conclusory result.4 
It must be presumed therefore, that Reagan does not (and in reality cannot) contest the 
factual record exhaustively and extensively cited to by Republic, and accordingly Reagan 
accepts all factual inferences naturally flowing therefrom in favor of Republic for all 
purposes of this appeal. The same must be equally true of UDOT for their reliance on 
Reagan's response. 
Of particular note, Reagan also cites to the November judgment, paragraphs D and 
3
 On appeal from a summary judgment we accept the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. Cahaness v. Thomas. 011510 USTS. (Ut. 2010); Franco v. 
Church of Jesus Christ of latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). 
4
 In fact, the September order was drafted and submitted by Reagan's counsel, and signed 
over objection of Republic, i.e., that it purported to make findings of fact when summary 
judgment is supposed to be made on undisputed facts. 
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F. Unquestionably Republic has attacked any assertion that the sign ultimately located on 
the North end of the Lindal property was ••existing" at the relevant time (which is the time 
of application, not time of denial) and Republic's entire issue 9 in its principal brief is 
specifically addressed to the fact that the little Lindal sign was not built per the R-407 
application and permit. To say otherwise is entirely disingenuous to this Court. 
2. Appellee South Salt Lake City's Statement of Facts. 
SSL stated to this Court ••However, in 2003 UDOT denied Republic's request for a 
permit on the basis that it was within 500 feet of the Lindal sign, and Republic was required 
to modify its sign so that it would not be visible from Interstate 15", citing to "(R. 3477-
78)'\ ( SSL's Brief, pg. 4). Republic acknowledges that in 2003 UDOT denied its state 
permit, from which this appeal ensued, but denies whole heartedly that anyone ever required 
Republic modify its sign so as to not be visible from 1-15. The sign structure remains in 
place as originally constructed and permitted by SSL. Republic has not advertised during this 
appeal (but the sign remains in place). The citation for which SSL relies is inaccurate, citing 
to the trial court's September 30, 2008 order and nowhere in there does the court say 
Republic was required to modify its sign. Republic challenges SSL to cite anywhere in the 
entire record, any such ••requirement" was made and specifically to either show where in 
record pages 3477-78 that ••requirement" exists, or retract same from its brief. 
The second correction to the record as represented by SSL concerns the statement that 
" It [Republic] attempted to modify its Network Electric appeal to include a challenge to the 
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WLH sign on June 7, 2006/* Here, it is true that Republic submitted an amended appeal, but 
only because it was required to by the prior decision of SSL Board of Adjustment. (R.1812, 
1851). Accordingly, applying the rule that all favorable inferences run to Republic, the court 
below and this Court should rule Republic was simply complying with administrative orders 
of the Board, and not somehow starting anew any appeal process as SSL improperly implies. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
A. THE ARGUMENTS OF SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY. 
I. Republic did timely appeal the Wilderness Log Homes permit when its Network 
Electric application was denied. 
SSL argues that as soon as Republic knew the construction of the WLH sign took 
place it should have appealed the city permit of Reagan's WLH sign. However, knowledge 
of that sign afforded no standing for Republic to appeal. This Court has already held that, in 
order to challenge administrative granting of a permit or license, the challenging party must 
be specifically injured. Ciilbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 
{Ciilbertson II) 128p.3d 1151 (Utah 2005). Whilethebuildingofthe WLH sign was within 
500 feet of the existing Deck Hockey sign of Republic, the WLII was applied for and a state 
permit granted after Republic appealed denial if its permit, and Republic had every right to 
expect that the WLH sign would be revoked once the Deck Hockey appeal was granted in 
Republic's favor (the first in time rule at UDOT). With respect to SSL, even they admit SSL 
has no problem permitting both Deck Hockey and WLH billboards inasmuch as the signs are 
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on opposite sides of Davis Drive and thus, under City ordinances, both signs are permitted. ' 
(R.1785). Moreover, SSL never purported to deny Republic's appeal under the guise it 
argues before this Court; rather, SSL initially acted upon the appeal filed by Republic in 
response to the Network Electric application. Republic obtained, and still holds, a valid SSL 
city building permit for its Deck Hockey billboard, Wilderness Log Homes sign 
notwithstanding. Thus why did Republic need to appeal WLH when it first learned of the 
existence of the sign? Any such City appeal would be summarily dismissed under the 
Culbertson II analysis. County and Municipalities cannot have it both ways, on the one hand 
deny any administrative challenge based on lack of specialized standing, and on the other 
hand claim you failed to appeal as soon as you knew the sign was built even when it did not 
damage you particularly.6 
Once Republic applied for the Network Electric permit at SSL, and was denied, and 
only then, did Republic have standing to challenge the City issuance of the WLH sign 
permit.7 Republic properly and timely appealed that decision, the record is clear on that. The 
5
 The SSL city code does, however, conflict with U.C.A. § 72-7-505(3), but you can't 
ever have SSL city code violations reviewed if the Court sweeps them under the rug of "failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies" 
6
 Reagan cites in its Brief Haymondv. Bonneville Billing and Collection, Inc.* 89 P.3d 
171 (Utah 2007) for the principle that self inflicted injury does not create standing. That case 
does not state that at all. It says absolutely nothing about self inflicted injury, rather it holds that 
absent specific damages to the complainant, other than emotional frustration and despair, one 
cannot sue. Raymond in fact lends supports to Republic's position that absent standing and 
specific damages, no appeal could be pursued. 
7
 Of course, granting that WLH permit at UDOT was a potential impairment to 
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matter went before SSL Board of Hqualization, who heard same and required staff to "further 
investigate" and to have Republic amend its appeal to include Reagan as a party, which 
Republic did. Then no real action of Republic's appeal except for letters assuring Republic 
matters would be looked into and meetings with SSL city attorney assuring Republic that 
the SSL appeal was pending, (but in fact had been derailed by Staff into the black hole of 
administrative oblivion, never to be seen or heard from again). That is fair and logical 
inference to which Republic is entitled, at least at summary judgment, based on the facts as 
they now exist. How an administrative body, such as SSL, can in good conscience, assure 
Republic its appeal is "still pending" (R. 1810, 1877) while acting through a licensed 
attorney, and then argue to this Court that Republic's appeal was always untimely from the 
very inception of the proceedings, even though they never stated that below, is more than 
unconscionable, its shameful. 
Its no wonder no Appellee chose to face the facts of this case head on. Its no wonder 
all Appellees chose to ignore the record below in their responsive briefs. It is a wonder, 
however, how government can be by the "consent of the governed" when that government's 
abuses are not reigned in by the courts sworn to do so. That consent is a fragile flower, as 
history shows us, and its left to the judiciary to cultivate the trust and faith in government lest 
the citizenry be left to the mercy of unrestrained governmental power. 
The remainder of SSL arguments go to notice of when the sign was built. Obviously, 
Republic's ultimate UDOT permit, but Republic cannot argue UDOTs malfeasance before SSL, 
the City has no jurisdiction over a State agency. 
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Republic knew the WLH sign was built when it filed its GRAMA request to find out how 
in the world this permit was granted by SSL. As an alternative. Republic would argue that 
it could not appeal until Republic was provided the information in order to have grounds to 
appeal. If SSL's interpretation is upheld, the law in Utah will be that you must appeal 
municipal licenses or permits within ten days even if you don't know if the permit or license 
was improperly granted. In other words, you must file against any municipal action you 
don't like and research the facts later. Is that really the policy this Court wants? Isn't the 
idea behind Rule 11 of the Court Rules just the opposite? Do your homework first and then 
file, that's what this Court, by rule, demands. Shall we depart from that sound policy 
regarding administrative appeals. Shoot first and see whose the culprit later? Kind of a 
dangerous policy isn't it? Appeal first and see if you even have standing later? Just as a 
matter of proper course of conduct. Republic's actions with respect to WLH were the 
pinnacle of appropriate decorum and restraint. They carefully investigated the facts, using 
the tools available to them, and then and only then did they complain, and only after they had 
a "dog in the fight" to complain about, i.e., the denial of Network Electric application. 
II. Republic is excused from any further administrative action by the conduct of SSL. 
As already noted before, the record below clearly provides at least an inference, if not 
complete proof, that SSL was not willing to further process Republic's appeal, the assurances 
of staff and City Attorney Carlson notwithstanding. As such, any further action by Republic 
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was wholly futile.8 SSL cites Salt lake City Mission v. Salt Lake City. 180 P 3d 599 (Utah 
2008) and Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466 (Utah 2003) for the proposition that 
futility does not apply merely because city officials are hostile. Republic wholeheartedly 
agrees with that. Here, SSL staff and City attorney were never "hostile" to Republic's face, 
they just refused to process the appeal further. Nothing happened after Carlson convinced the 
Board of Equalization that it could not act without Reagan present. By lobbying SSL City 
to change its overhang ordinance, Reagan was able to legalize some of its previous WLH 
deficiencies and illegalities. Nevertheless, the appeal process of Republic's Network Electric 
permit was indefinitely derailed. When were the rest of the deficiencies and illegalities to 
be addressed?9 Apparently the laws of SSL are to be only selectively applied. How does 
Republic Outdoor become a member of SSL's "favored parties" who are immune from the 
restrictions and laws applicable to everyone else? These facts overwhelmingly distinguish 
the Salt Lake City Mission and Patterson cases where neither Plaintiff could show any 
specific facts to support futility. Here, by contrast, we have both disparity of application of 
the ordinances and a complete refusal to process the appeal further (despite the edicts of the 
Board of Equalization). What more futility could ever be established? 
x
 In fact, under the current SSL city code permit appeals to the Board of Equalization of 
are entirely eliminated in favor of an internal appellate process. Of course the new code is not 
applicable retroactively to this case. 
9
 As noted in Republic's principal brief a year after the appeal some of Reagan's 
purported "cap" and replace signs were still not removed. (R.1680, 1696). The "bait and switch" 
tactic used by Reagan to get special height allowances in violation of SSL ordinances still 
remains unchecked even today. 
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III. The alleged "findings" written by counsel for Reagan are not entitled to any 
deference. 
As already noted, this Court affords no deference to the legal conclusions given to 
support the grant of summary judgment.10 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated 
Geographic Reference Center. 200 P.3d 643 (Utah 2008); (Schurtz v BMW of N. Am., Inc., 
814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991) [emphasis added]. Moreover, the reviewing Court views the 
facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Downing v. Highland 
Pharmacy, 194 P. 3d 944 (Utah 2008). Both SSL and Reagan place great weight on the 
purported "findings" of the trial Court, apparently hoping this Court will not apply the proper 
standard of review. Republic has faith that the Appellate Court will view the September 
Order with no deference, especially where its drafted by the opposing party.11 
B. THE ARGUMENTS OF ROA GENERAL. 
PREFACE: Throughout Reagan's brief rather than cite to the record wherein they rely on 
certain facts as having been presented to the trial Court, they cite only to the September 30, 
2008 order signed by Judge Trease, but which order was (1) drafted by Reagan's counsel and 
10
 On appeal from a summary judgment we accept the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. Cabaness v. Thomas\ 011510 USTS, (Ut. 2010); Franco v. 
Church of Jesus Christ of latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). 
11
 Ironically the only change to that Order was one paragraph wherein Judge 
Trease made a hand written correction to paragraph 8 that the only remaining issue in this 
"de novo review" was whether "UDOT's and the hearing officer's denial of the permit 
were proper" after stating at oral arguments that Republic would not be afforded a de 
novo review. (R.3487; 3393, p. 133) 
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(2) contains no citations to the underlying trial court record itself, thus leaving the reviewing 
Court unable to know where these "mysterious facts" allegedly derived by the Court come 
from. 
In reality. Judge Trease said little more at the oral argument than she was granting 
summary judgment on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and 
certainly did not make any detailed factual findings herself. Republic, on the other hand, has 
meticulously cited to the trial court record itself, to show what facts were before the trial 
court and should have been considered in opposition to Appellees* motions for summary 
judgment, if not in favor of Republic's own motion for summary judgment. 
For example, Reagan refers to the "existing sign" at Lindal Cedar Homes. Well it 
didn't exist at the time Republic applied for Deck Hockey permit with SSL, it didn't exist 
when the Deck Hockey sign structure was erected, it didn't exist when Republic applied for 
a UDOT permit, and it didn't exist at the time the Hearing Officer approved the stipulation 
for granting the resurrected 1998 R-407 application in January, 2002, and it didn't exist at 
the time Reagan finally got a SSL permit to build on Lindal Cedar Homes in March 2002. 
True it did exist when UDOT finally chose to deny Republic's permit almost 6 months after 
the January 2002 stipulation was entered into, but Republic contends the "first in time rule" 
applies to an application, a properly completed application, not an altered, forged or ex-post 
facto contrived one. 
Throughout the Reagan Brief it asserts Republic has not challenged the "factual 
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findings" of Judge Trease. Republic didn't have to. These are not findings and conclusions 
made after a trial, where the finder of fact resolved disputed issues, but was a ruling on 
summary judgment, where Republic is entitled to have all facts and reasonable inferences 
construed in its favor, for purposes of the summary judgment motions against it. Republic 
accorded Judge Trease's alleged factual findings no deference whatsoever. That's what the 
law says, and that's what Republic did. Reality is, Reagan could not possibly reconcile the 
facts below with the ruling of Judge Trease and accordingly chose to simply ignore the facts 
before the trial court in favor of hypothecated and unsupported alleged "findings" made by 
Reagan for signing by the Court below (over objection of Republic for this very reason). 
IV. The District Court improperly upheld the denial of Republic's Deck Hockey 
application. 
There is, and never has been a dispute that two outdoor advertising signs cannot be 
permitted within 500 feet of each other under state law.12 However, in their haste to contrive 
and resurrect the ancient 1998 R-407, UDOT and Reagan failed to modify the precise 
language specifying what change was being made, i.e., "move sign approx. 300f to south 
from So. Property line of Lindal Homes" (R.84) which ultimately remained in the signed 
off permit. So, when was the South Swanson sign moved approximately 300'? In fact when 
12
 Unless of course you're Reagan Outdoor sign company, in which case you can 
apparently have your South Swanson sign 90 feet away from your newly erected Lindal Cedar 
Homes sign for over two years while you put together your Wilderness Log Homes application, 
with the intent to return to advertising on South Swanson as soon as you have successfully 
blocked Republic's Deck Hockey permit application. 
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was it ever moved, one foot, one inch or any other distance? Never! 300 feet from the south 
property line is right where Republic's Deck Hockey sign structure is today. How can the 
Court or anyone else honestly say the little Lindal sign was built where it was permitted. 
They cannot and this ruse, this sham should end here on this appeal once and for all. 
But more importantly. Republic appealed the denial of its permit administratively, the 
sole ground for denial being that Reagan's little Lindal sign was approved and was within 
500' of Republic's Deck Hockey sign. After denial of informal adjudicative proceedings, and 
denial of reconsideration. Republic timely appealed to District Court and was entitled to a 
trial de novo on that issue unquestionably.13 Yet when Reagan ceased using Lindal and 
returned to advertising on South Swanson, Republic was still denied its Deck Hockey permit 
(which was more then 500' from South Swanson) because well that remains a mystery. 
Where was trial de novo on that issue? How did Republic fail to exhaust administrative 
remedies on that issue? 
V. Republic did properly exhaust administrative remedies and any alleged failure is 
excusable as an exception. 
Lets specifically address the characterizations propounded in the Reagan brief. 
First, Reagan makes note that at least as of November 2002 Republic learned that 
UDOT was now considering acting on the 1998 Lindal R-407. (Reagan's Brief, pg. 8) . 
However, that ignores the fact that when they learned of it they were told by both Reagan's 
13
 See. e.g. U.C.A. §72-7-508(4)(a). 
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counsel and UDOT's counsel that "if s a done deal", meaning its already too late to stop it. 
(R. 1998,1990). Second, unlike court proceedings, UDOT files are not open to the public and 
not open to competitors to examine. Reagan cannot just go look at Republic's application and 
Republic cannot go look in Reagan's files. So how would Republic know Reagan's 
proceedings were formal? The losing party is entitled to reasonable inferences from the 
facts, not the moving party. Yet here, the Court below construed the facts against Republic 
and presumed they must know Reagan's appeal was formal adjudication that could have been 
intervened into. 
Put all that aside and assume, for the sake of argument, Republic runs in and 
intervenes in November 2002 into the Reagan proceedings. What could Republic have 
argued in that intervention? Republic could have argued that Reagan's SSL permit had 
lapsed and that's all. Republic could not argue that the R-407 has been altered, because that 
hasn't happened yet. It could not argue that the South Swanson sign was never moved, 
because that hadn't happened yet, (in fact Lindal wasn't built until well after the hearing 
officer approved the 1998 R-407 stipulation between UDOT and Reagan in January 2002). 
Republic couldn't argue that the application was forged, because that hadn't happened yet. 
The singular argument Republic could have made in any intervention into the Lindal 
proceedings was that Reagan's SSL permit had expired, and we already know the 
Department's position on that because they ruled on that precise issue in Republic's informal 
adjudication proceedings. Therein the hearing officer stated: "Nothing in the rules or state 
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statutes requires that a building permit be consistently renewed throughout the pendency of 
appeal. I am not inclined to impose any such requirement." (R. 1556)14 One exception to the 
exhaustion of remedies doctrine applies where the party invoking the exception can 
positively state that the agency has declared what its ruling would be on a particular case. 
Coachella Valley Misquito Control v. Perb. 35 Cal 4th 1074, 29 Cal Rptr. 3d 234, 112 P.3d 
623 (Cal. 2005). Here, with total certainty. Republic can attest that the mere fact of the lapse 
of the SSL permit would not have changed the outcome even if Republic had intervened into 
the proceedings it had no way of knowing were formal. 
And into what "proceedings" was Republic supposed to have intervened? The District 
Court had remanded the Reagan's 1998 matter back to UDOT 4 years earlier for 
negotiations, not further hearings. And there were no further hearings formal or informal. 
And what UDOT's counsel and Reagan's counsel had said in November, 2002, to Republic 
was correct - it already was a done deal by then. By the time Republic learned of the 
complicity between UDOT and Reagan to cheat Republic out of a permit, the fix was already 
in. The trial court below held Republic to an impossible standard, an omniscience that 
Republic could not possibly have possessed, and an illusory remedy. 
But follow with me further, if you will, down the road of this insanity. Republic 
should have, says Reagan, intervened into Reagan's 1998 Lindal proceedings, which we 
14
 The hearing officer then goes on in fn. 2 of the Amended Findings and Order to give 
his "frozen facts theory" that the facts are frozen as of the application date during an appeal. Of 
course that same theory fails to apply to Republic's appeal. 
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already know UDOT would have denied because Republic could only argue the lapse of city 
permit at that time. But notice, Republic's permit has not yet been denied. So Republic must 
appeal to the District Court the granting of Reagan's Lindal permit even before its own 
permit is turned down. Because Republic is still awaiting its own permit denial, its not yet 
exhausted its administrative remedies, so its appeal is premature and dismissed. When UDOT 
finally, some six months later finally denies Republic's application, Republic must appeal, 
or be guilty of failing to exhaust administrative remedies, but now when the Department 
again denies Republics appeal, its appeal to the District Court is too late, because res judicata 
precludes re-litigating the same issues earlier dismissed in the premature appeal from 
Reagan's formal proceedings. 
But by now, Reagan has indeed done many of the things Republic asserts in this 
appeal. Reagan has now not moved the Swanson sign, built a new sign 90 feet from it, and 
forged or altered the 1998 R-407 (again most of which Republic could not have known about 
without extensive discovery). According to UDOT, Republic should have filed a Request 
for Agency Action (even though Mark Burns, UDOT's counsel, admits he had never seen 
this done during his tenure)(R.989, pg 23). So now yet a third administrative proceeding is 
required to satisfy the Appellees' creative imagination. 
Thus while that third agency action is pending, what happens to Republic's appeal to 
District Court from the denial of its Deck Hockey application? If Republic files in District 
Court, it will again be premature, because the Request for Agency Action is still pending. Yet 
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if Republic delays until the Request for Agency Action is completed, more than 30 days will 
have elapsed since the UDOT denial of its administrative appeal and it will be forever 
foreclosed. 
No Utah case has ever addressed this specific issue, because likely no agency has ever 
taken such a ludicrous position as is maintained in this case. The only case this counsel could 
find addressing the issue was Davis v. Human Rights Comm '/?, 676 N.E. 2d 315 111. App. 1st. 
Dist. 1997) which held that where multiple administrative remedies exist, only one need be 
exhausted. This Court should adopt this same reasoned decision to avoid the "trap" any 
agency can create by arguing, as here, well you 'coulda done more, better, sooner, faster', 
etc.15 
Reagan argues that Republic owed a duty to advise the administrative agency of "an 
error that could be corrected" citing Holladay Town Center, LLC, v. Holladay City 192 
P.3d 302 ( Utah 2008). However, that case is inapposite to the case at bar. In Holladay, the 
Walgreen's Drug store applicant did not file an appeal when its initial application was 
denied, electing instead to work with City officials who imposed a moratorium on new 
permits. Here, Republic did administratively appeal and did raise all that it knew about in 
15
 Reagan asserts that Republic could have learned the Reagan proceedings were formal 
by filing a GRAMA request. However, Republic only learned UDOT was considering the ancient 
1998 R-407 in late November. 2002. around Thanksgiving, and were told "it's a done deal". A 
GRAMA request cannot get access to protected records under U.C. A. §62G-2-305, such as a 
competitor's application file with UDOT. Eventually one may get those records, but here 
Republic was deliberately misled by UDOT into thinking it was already "a done deaf. 
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its appeal.16 
Finally, with respect to the alleged "request for agency action" as already noted, 
UDOT's own counsel had never seen it done before. Moreover, Republic tried that with 
respect to the WLH sign, and got nothing other than a letter saying they would look into it 
within 30 days. (R.733-823). 
Thus this is another red herring issue created by Appellees. A procedure never before 
done and when attempted results in nothing. Yet the trial court below finds that Republic 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, obviously construing the facts against Republic, 
not in favor of them! Proper application of the rules of summary judgment dictate the Court 
construe these facts as showing the futility of any "request for agency action". 
VI. Republic did show both bias and manifest injustice under the circumstances of this 
case. 
Republic has shown that the very hearing officer that approved the Reagan/UDOT 
settlement was the same hearing officer presiding over Republic's informal adjudicative 
hearing. As noted in Republic's principal brief, prejudgment of the facts constitutes bias, 
,6The majority of the malfeasance below occurred in secret between UDOT and Reagan 
and Republic was not privy to that until formal discovery in this appeal. However, the Agency 
knew, it participated in each step of the scam. UDOT provided the original 1998 R-407 
application to Dewey Reagan to alter, admittedly well after changes to the form of the application 
could be legally made.( R.407, 1654-59:2168-70). UDOT admits it has no rule allowing 
amendments of permit applications and that it has no rule making any such changes retroactive. 
(R.1944). This is not a case where the agency was left in the dark—this is a case where Republic 
was left in the dark! The agency, if not in fact the orchestrator of this sham, was at least an 
active and willing participant therein. To the total denial of Republic's due process rights. 
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Clisham v. Board of Police Com >5.613 A. 2d 254 (Conn. 1992). Moreover, the facts of this 
case show oppression by the administrative agency. The agency decides to revive and act 
upon Reagan's 1998 R-407 as a result of Republic's Deck Hockey application, and to do so 
unilaterally without notice to Republic.17 The agency, by and through its counsel, advises 
Republic officials as soon as they (Republic officials) learn of the impending UDOT action 
that "it's a done deal" when in fact the paperwork was not yet completed until some 45 days 
later. The agency, by and through the permit officer, acts in concert with Reagan officials to 
alter the 1998 R-407 after its issuance and upon learning that Reagan had constructed a little 
sign to comply with the SSL building permit it got. This is done despite the permit officer's 
own admission he cannot legally allow any changes to the form after its originally signed off. 
(R. 1654-59) 
Further the permit officer never required the permanent Swanson sign purported to 
be moved actually be moved as the 1998 R-407 dictated. In fact, the Lindal sign is not a 
"move" sign at all, its an add one sign inasmuch as Reagan's South Swanson sign structure 
has never left its footing. However, an "add" one sign requires a T-99 new application, not 
a R-407 change request. UDOT ignores the 500 feet spacing requirement vis- a-vis Reaganlx 
17
 Reagan argues in its brief that Republic's informal adjudication attacks the issuance of 
the permit to Reagan without them being present and this affects their due process rights. The 
same is true of Reagan's processing the 1998 R-407 ex-parle to Republic. What about Republic's 
due process rights? 
18
 Apparently Reagan has a "special dispensation" to the law at UDOT no competitor 
likewise enjoys. Is monopolization really the purpose and intent of the Highway Beautification 
Act? 
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and permits the Lindal sign anyway. The Lindal sign is not located "move sign approx. 300? 
to south from So. Property line of Lindal Homes'1 as set forth in the 1998 R-407 but a new 
sign added just 90' from South Swanson on the north end of Lindal Homes. (See Addendum 
1 hereto and Edward Rogers 2nd Affidavit, R. 3513-3554 wherein Rogers identifies that 300 
feet south of Lindal is precisely where Deck Hockey sign is built today.) 
The altered or forged 1998 R-407 is then given retroactive effect despite the fact the 
agency has neither a rule allowing for amendment of permits or retroactive effect. Reagan 
argues in its brief that the facts set forth in Republic's opening brief are wholly irrelevant, 
but they are precisely relevant to show the oppression of the agency action below. 
VII. The trial Court denied Republic trial de novo on all issues. 
U.C.A. §72-7-508(4)(a) specifically provides that the district courts shall have 
jurisdiction to review all final orders of the department under this part resulting from formal 
or informal adjudicative proceedings.19 There is no doubt that Republic pursued its informal 
appeals process through the department and timely appealed that final order to District Court. 
Trial de novo means that Republic should have been able to show that the Lindal sign was 
no longer in place and therefore not an impediment to issuance of the Deck Hockey permit. 
This the Court refused to do. Its not trial de novo if you're precluded from presenting the 
And in fact, upon denying Republic's request for reconsideration. Hearing officer Miles 
specifically instructed Republic that if they were aggrieved with the decision their next remedy 
was appeal to District Court, not intervention or Request for agency action, but District Court 
appeal. (R. 1923) 
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facts and information obtained during discovery.20 
The fact is that the 1998 R-407, as fictitiously altered ex-post facto after issuance, is 
a false and misleading statement in violation of U.C.A. §72-7-508(1) (c) inasmuch as the 
South Swanson sign has never moved and never relocated as required by the permit. 
Unfortunately, the watchdog of this statute, UDOT, was a participant in the falsifying the 
permit. How can Republic get enforcement of the laws when the caretaker is part of the 
problem? 
Reagan repeatedly complains that the Deck Hockey billboard was within 500 feet of 
the Lindal site. Yet they fail to acknowledge that Lindal was within 90 feet of South 
Swanson, their own billboard! The attached pictures (Addendum 2 hereto) taken by permit 
officer Debenham, per permit requirement, clearly show both signs in egregious violation of 
SSL, state and federal outdoor advertising spacing requirements. The permit at Lindal was 
void on its face for false information contained therein. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the summary judgment granted against Republic should be 
reversed and summary judgment granted to Republic. Alternatively, the matter should be 
20
 Reagan argues in its brief that Republic could have had discovery at the adjudicative 
level, citing to Utah Admin. Rule R-907-1-10 (14)(a). However, that discovery right applies 
solely to formal adjudications, and even then discovery is discretionary, not mandatory. It is 
highly unlikely the hearing officer would have ordered the extensive depositions that were 
required in this case to uncover who, when and how the 1998 R-407 was altered, as the permit 
officers identified individuals in his deposition that in fact did not participate in the altering of 
the document. Only after 4 depositions was the truth revealed that Dewey Reagan himself altered 
the permit on the last day for inspection, and 60 days after its initial issuance. (R.. 2168-70) 
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remanded for trial on the issues set forth herein. Appellant should have its costs awarded to 
it. 
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